QTS-063 · Assessment and assurance · 2020
Queenstown Business Case – Assurance Process
Part of: Rapid transit evidence →
This 157-page Assurance Process chapter (Final, 25 November 2020) records the quality assurance and peer review of the Queenstown Business Case, with reviews and project team responses appended. These comprise a Stantec internal review against the 16 IQA questions (App. A), QLDC feedback (B), an Arup drawings review (C), an AECOM review (D), Matthew Roberts' QLDC review (E), the Waka Kotahi IQA review (F) by Chad Barker, Rob Woods, Graeme Belliss and Brian Waddell, the Commute peer review (G), the Flow transport economics review (H), the EY wider-economic-benefits review (I) and Way to Go Board comments on the Summary (J). An Independent Challenge Team, including Pete Clark, reviewed the emerging programme in February 2020. Commute found the case fit for purpose, Flow found every sensitivity BCR stayed above 1.0, and EY found the WEB analysis robust and defensible. The IQA judged the $262m offline PT solution 'unlikely to be supportable at this stage' as 'too far in the future'. Reviewers asked whether mass rapid transit would proceed. The file is NZTA's copy released under OIA-23524, with individual names withheld under section 9(2)(a).
What the document says
Context and purpose: The chapter 'details the QA process... the responses to the Business Case iterations; and the peer reviews' (p.4). After the IQA, all documents were marked Final. Further updates might follow from the Way to Go Board, QLDC and/or ORC 'prior to completion of the Business Case for Waka Kotahi Board delivery' (p.4). As of 25 November, documents were resubmitted for council and committee support 'before presentation to the Waka Kotahi Board in December'. A modelling peer review was still 'in process' (p.5).
Reviews: The Independent Challenge Team (Pete Clark, Waka Kotahi, with colleagues from PwC and Mein Consulting) was briefed in February 2020; its issues went to the W2G Board and are not appended (p.4). Two senior Stantec staff reviewed the 7 September draft against the 16 IQA questions (App. A, pp.6-15). Client reviewers were Tony Sizemore, Garry Maloney and Tony Pickard. AECOM and Arup reviewed for QLDC (pp.4-5), and Matthew Roberts of QLDC reviewed late (App. E) (p.5). The IQA review began on 8 October 2020 (App. F, pp.81-94). Commute found the case 'fit for purpose and able to allow investors to make an informed decision'. It recommended a total programme BCR, a clearer document structure and more sensitivity testing (pp.98-111). Flow (20 October 2020) found 'sufficient confidence in the assessment to progress to the next stage'. It removed double-counted farebox benefits and cut VOT/VOC benefits by 20-33%; BCRs stayed above 1.0 (pp.115-122). EY (29 October 2020) called the WEB analysis 'robust and defensible' (p.126). Way to Go Board members Peter Clark, Peter Hansby, Kesh Keshaboina and Gavin Palmer annotated the 2 October Final Draft Summary (App. J, pp.134-157).
IQA findings: The Management Case has gaps (governance links, roles, property strategy, Spatial Plan alignment) (pp.82-84). There is a risk to ORC's ability to plan and co-fund the 2027-30 PT step change (p.84). The IQA recommends trigger-based timing (p.85). Road-based PT with TDM and parking is 'likely to be the most cost-effective response' (p.91). It notes political risk in parking policy (p.92).
Mass rapid transit: The IQA states: 'Arterials Stage 3 ($61m) and offline PT solution ($262m) unlikely to be supportable at this stage – low BCR and too far in the future respectively' (p.85). It notes PT benefits 'gradually reduce as the network reaches severe over-capacity by 2048 and a new offline solution is considered the only feasible option from that point onwards' (p.91). It adds that the case for a full offline Frankton facility 'has not been made with a clear evidence base' (p.82). The trigger for the Frankton hub is 'the point at which offline transport infrastructure needed' (p.85). A QLDC reviewer asked whether it was 'intentional to narrow focus on gondola solution' (p.17). AECOM described TN30 as 'technically poor' and said 'it is not clear if the gondola will proceed' (p.47); it also asked to 'state which is the preferred option as offline PT service' (p.50). When Matthew Roberts asked for detail on co-funding offline PT, the response was that 'Offline PT is too far in the future and too uncertain', and that 'some form of sponsorship agreement could be reached' (p.69).
Source: NZTA's copy released under the Official Information Act 1982 (OIA-23524, 16 October 2026), with individual names withheld under section 9(2)(a).
Key figures
- IQA submission 8 October 2020; documents resubmitted 25 November 2020 for Waka Kotahi Board in December (pp.4-5)
- Flow sensitivity BCRs after removing farebox and cutting VOT/VOC 20%: 2.9, 2.8, 1.9, 1.7, 1.3; 33%: 2.6, 2.5, 1.7, 1.5, 1.2 (p.121)
- IQA: Arterials Stage 3 $61m vs $118m discrepancy; offline PT $262m (p.85)
- PT step change from 360 to 873 people per hour in 2024-27 (IQA, p.85)
- Virtual priority on SH6A gives 60% of benefits at 5% of cost of extra lanes (p.91)
Rapid transit
Mass rapid transit means light rail, gondola/cable car, bus rapid transit and similar dedicated rapid-transit technologies. It does not include ordinary bus services or ferries.
Substantive. Discusses, assesses, recommends or programmes mass rapid transit.
The investment quality assurance judged the $262m offline public transport option unsupportable at this stage, as too far in the future, yet the only feasible option after about 2048; reviewers asked how the mass rapid transit option was being treated.
The Waka Kotahi IQA recorded: 'Arterials Stage 3 ($61m) and offline PT solution ($262m) unlikely to be supportable at this stage – low BCR and too far in the future respectively' (p.85). It also said road-based PT 'ostensibly can accommodate projected growth for the next three decades', with benefits that 'gradually reduce as the network reaches severe over-capacity by 2048 and a new offline solution is considered the only feasible option from that point onwards' (p.91). On Frankton, 'the case for a full offline facility has not been made with a clear evidence base' (p.82). The project team responded that 'The trigger for the Frankton hub is essentially the point at which offline transport infrastructure needed' (p.85). A QLDC reviewer asked: 'Is it intentional to narrow focus on gondola solution?' (p.17). AECOM said TN30 'is technically poor as it does not present enough evidence' and 'it is not clear if the gondola will proceed' (p.47). Responding to Matthew Roberts on co-funding, the team said 'Offline PT is too far in the future an[d] too uncertain', adding that 'some form of sponsorship agreement could be reached' (p.69).
"Arterials Stage 3 ($61m) and offline PT solution ($262m) unlikely to be supportable at this stage – low BCR and too far in the future respectively." (p.85) | "these benefits gradually reduce as the network reaches severe over-capacity by 2048 and a new offline solution is considered the only feasible option from that point onwards." (p.91) | "This document is technically poor as it does not present enough evidence on the assessment that has been conducted. In addition, it is not clear if the gondola will proceed." (p.47) | "note that reference is made specifically to gondola (long term), rather than MRT. Is it intentional to narrow focus on gondola solution?" (p.17) | "Offline PT is too far in the future an too uncertain, at this stage, to seek this level of detail. In line with overseas examples, some form of sponsorship agreement could be reached" (p.69)
Files
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Main document
Actions recorded
Further review and update by Way to Go Board, QLDC and/or ORC before completion for Waka Kotahi Board delivery.
Not assessed · Way to Go · Before Waka Kotahi Board, December 2020
there may be a further review and updates required from the Way to Go Board, QLDC and/or ORC
Review Matt Roberts' (QLDC) outstanding comments and respond where opportunity for further update arises.
Not assessed · Next update
the project team will review Matt's comments and respond where appropriate
Seek review and support of respective Councils and Committees before presentation to the Waka Kotahi Board.
Not assessed · QLDC · December 2020
require the review and support of the respective Councils and Committees, before presentation to the Waka Kotahi Board in December
IQA: progress the PT Services Detailed Business Case urgently alongside NZUP pre-implementation and the Park and Ride SSBC.
Not assessed · Urgently
should be progressed urgently alongside NZUP projects pre-imp and the Park and Ride SSBC
IQA: clarify investment triggers (demand/patronage) in the Management Case instead of or as well as years.
Not assessed · Before completion · Relevant to rapid transit
Can we turn our responses into triggers (i.e. demand/patronage etc) instead of/as well as years?
IQA: Frankton hub stage 2 land acquisition requires further justification via business case update in 2024-27 before any process begins.
Not assessed · 2024-27 · Relevant to rapid transit
Further justification is required before any land acquisition process can be made
IQA/Management Case: allocate TDM SSBC lead (allocated to QLDC in Management Case Table 7 response).
Not assessed · QLDC · 2021-24
Table 7 of management case allocates this to QLDC as the lead
Add Spatial Plan integration to risk register and note SP preferred option modelled but not approved.
Not assessed · Before completion
Add integration with Spatial Plan to risk register
Study cost
Costed with the parent document.
Citation
Way to Go partnership, NZTA (Waka Kotahi), QLDC, ORC. Queenstown Business Case – Assurance Process (2020). Commute report J00886 (appended, p.98).