QTS-045 · Business case chapter or appendix · 2020
Appendix B Options Assessment (B1 Options Development Process; B2 Longlist Options; B3 Modelling Reports; B4 Future Public Transport Model; B5 Technical Note 30: High Capacity Public Transport; B6 Technical Note 12: Queenstown Public Transport Development Story; B7 Technical Note 18: Queenstown Lakeview Bus Service Analysis)
Part of: Rapid transit evidence →
Appendix B of the 2020 NZUP Queenstown Transport Detailed Business Case for NZTA (Waka Kotahi) documents how options were developed and assessed. It contains the option development process (B1), the Frankton to Queenstown and town centre long lists (B2), which include Frankton Track, Queenstown Hill and Kelvin Peninsula mass rapid transit alignments, and traffic and economic modelling reports (B3). It also includes WSP's public transport demand and economic notes TN3b and TN3c (B4) and three Stantec technical notes. TN12 (February 2020) describes six public transport network options, including a mass rapid transit network, and an unweighted multi-criteria analysis (MCA). It finds a road-based 'Bus Max' network could serve demand until about 2038, after which mass rapid transit is considered 'the best option'. TN12 also lists four circumstances in which mass rapid transit could be advanced. TN30 (July 2020, footer November 2020) sets out a staged 'Bus Max' pathway to 2051 and asks the Board to approve that 'off-line PT to SH6A (e.g. a gondola) is parked and reviewed in 2028'. TN18 concludes that buses should not be routed into Lakeview. The modelling reports find the NZUP package keeps SH6A below capacity at 2028 with parking restraint, and that Frankton becomes severely congested by 2048.
What the document says
Context and purpose: Appendix B of the Queenstown Transport Business Case (NZTA Contract 2018235; Stantec-led consortium with WSP Opus, Abley and Jasmax) for NZTA (Waka Kotahi) and the Way to Go partners. It brings together the options development material and supporting modelling. All consultant author, reviewer and approver names are redacted under s 9(2)(a).
B1 (pp3-5) explains that the Frankton to Queenstown work came straight from the QITPBC and 'morphed into a network-wide public transport response' (p3). B2 (pp7-10) is the long list. Under '1.6 Mass Rapid Transit' it lists bus rapid transit, light rail options, '1.6.5 Frankton Track gondola', '1.6.6 Queenstown Hill gondola', '1.6.7 North Shore MRT' and '1.6.8 Kelvin Peninsula gondola' (p8). The town centre list includes 'Frankton Track for MRT' and 'Gondola landing location' (p10).
B3 contains the Stantec/WSP/Abley Future Modelling Option Report (16 September 2020). It models NZUP scenarios with Arterial stages and a Stanley Street closure. The Do Minimum scenarios 'locked up' in Paramics (p17). The report recommends further northbound bus lanes beyond 2028 because Frankton is severely congested by 2048 (pp50-51). B3 also contains Abley's Business Case Modelling Report (17 November 2020), which gives annualised NZUP benefits of about $34-35m in 2028/2048 (p83) and a 13% Spatial Plan uplift in NPV benefits, from $382m to $431m (p84). B4 contains WSP TN3b and TN3c. They find the NZUP option keeps SH6A at 82-86% v/c in 2028, with parking cost a 'major driver' of PT share (pp132-133, 142). They also record that 'Gondola MRT' was tested earlier but 'omitted for implementability reasons' (p129).
B6 TN12 (18 February 2020) describes six network options: RTI, Do Minimum, Bus Max, Trackless Tram (base and Max), mass rapid transit and a ferry option. A ferry is not mass rapid transit (pp212-217). It summarises the evidence base, including 2048 travel times and opex (p219). An MCA was presented on 2 August 2019 and 'agreed to and adopted largely unaltered' (p220). The MCA scores 17 criteria from -3 to +3. As printed, mass rapid transit scores 2, 3, 3, 1, 3, 2, 3, 1, 0, -2, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3, and Bus Max scores 2, 3, 1, 0, 3, 3, 2, 3, 2, -2, 2, 1, 3, 1, 3, -1, 1. No weights or totals are printed (pp220, 205-206). Do Minimum and Ferry were dropped. The remaining options were then simplified to 'HCPT' (bus to trackless tram) and mass rapid transit (p221). TN12 concludes that Bus Max provides capacity for about 15-18 years and runs out 'by 2038 at the latest'. It considers mass rapid transit 'the best option at this point' and lists four circumstances for advancing it (pp224-225). The mass rapid transit capex estimate is $134.83m (p225).
B5 TN30 (13 July 2020; 'November 2020' footers) sets out current PT issues, NZUP's $90m PT infrastructure and a staged Bus Max pathway. Opex rises from $13.2m (2024) to $39.1m (2051), and the fleet is estimated at $46m (pp200-205). It cites Aspen's 67.8% non-car commute share (p198). It records the mass-transit ferry being ruled out by MCA (p198) and appends the same MCA as TN12 (pp205-206). B7 TN18 concludes buses should not enter Lakeview (p228).
Mass rapid transit: Substantive. The long list names three mass rapid transit alignments (p8). TN12 describes Queenstown–Frankton (and optionally Ladies Mile) mass rapid transit with a travellator to the airport and a possible extension to the airport and Remarkables Park (pp216, 221). In the unweighted MCA, mass rapid transit scores at or near the top on growth, resilience, reliability, safety and masterplan alignment, and scores -2 on capex (p220). TN12 sees mass rapid transit as the next step change by 2038. TN30 instead says on-road PT can meet demand to about 2051. It gives two main grounds: on-road options can be implemented under current PT operational and procurement frameworks and best maximise value from the $90m NZUP investment, and mass rapid transit 'does not fit well' with current legislative and procurement processes. It recommends the Board approve that off-line PT 'is parked and reviewed in 2028' (pp202, 205). The four circumstances for advancing mass rapid transit appear in TN12 (p224), not TN30.
Key figures
- Gondola option capex estimate $134.83 million for Queenstown to Frankton (TN12, p225)
- Gondola annual opex estimate $4.9 million for Queenstown to Frankton; gondola-based network total opex $18,888,037 p.a. vs Bus Max $12,823,050 (TN12, pp219, 225)
- Gondola network assumptions: cabin every 15 seconds, 10 passengers per cabin, 22 km/h (TN12, p216); service every 30 seconds in later frequency table (p222)
- 2048 AM peak travel time to Queenstown Town Centre from Frankton: gondola 22 min, Bus Max 17 min, car 14-16 min, with footnote 'Updated evidence of gondola having similar travel times to Bus Max and Trackless Tram Max' (TN12, p219)
- 2048 mode share: Bus Max 47%, Trackless Tram 51%; Frankton fast ferry 10% mode shift (TN12, p218)
- Bus Max ultimate capacity about 1,800 passengers/hour/direction, runs out of capacity 'by 2038 at the latest' (TN12, pp223-224); TN30 says on-road PT can meet demand 'until around 2051' using bi-articulated buses or trackless trams (p202)
- Bus Max fleet for full 2030 roll-out estimated at $46 million incl. 12% spares (TN30, p204; TN12, p225)
- PT network gross opex (uninflated 2020 $): $13,177,351 (2024) rising to $39,063,855 (2051) (TN30 Appendix 1, p205)
- Ferry MCA option: operating cost about $900/hour per ferry, vessels up to $4 million, capacity about 800 passengers/hour (TN30, p198)
- Patronage tripled from ≈500,000 to ≈1,500,000 p.a. after the November 2017 network change (TN30, p193)
- Annualised transport benefits of NZUP package with Stanley St open: $34.0m (2028), $35.1m (2048), undiscounted (Abley, p83)
- Spatial Plan sensitivity: NPV benefits of NZUP package rise from $382m to $431m (+13%) (Abley, p84)
- NZUP option SH6A v/c 82%-86% at 2028 (TN3b, p133)
- Unmet PT demand on SH6A at 2048 without NZUP: 196 (AM), 93 (IP), 600 (PM) (TN3c, p184)
Rapid transit
Mass rapid transit means light rail, gondola/cable car, bus rapid transit and similar dedicated rapid-transit technologies. It does not include ordinary bus services or ferries.
Substantive. Discusses, assesses, recommends or programmes mass rapid transit.
Rates mass rapid transit strongly in the multi-criteria assessment and as the best post-2038 step change, but recommends off-line public transport be 'parked and reviewed in 2028'.
The B2 long list includes 'Frankton Track gondola', 'Queenstown Hill gondola' and 'Kelvin Peninsula gondola' under Mass Rapid Transit (p8). TN12 describes mass rapid transit from Queenstown Town Centre to Frankton Hub (optionally Ladies Mile), with a cabin every 15 seconds, 10 passengers per cabin and 22 km/h (p216). It costs mass rapid transit at $134.83m capex and $4.9m opex per year (p225). The 2 August 2019 MCA scores six options on 17 criteria from -3 to +3, with no weights or totals printed (p220; repeated in TN30, pp205-206). TN12 says Bus Max 'would run out of capacity... by 2038 at the latest' and that 'the gondola option is the best option at this point' (p224). It lists four circumstances for advancing mass rapid transit: insufficient bus priority on SH6/SH6A, Bus Max capex/opex 'not forthcoming', faster demand growth, and a PPP in which the public sector funds outcomes 'capped by the actual capacity of the gondola' (p224). TN30 states on-road PT can meet demand 'until around 2051'. It gives as grounds that on-road options fit current frameworks and maximise the $90m NZUP investment, and that mass rapid transit 'does not fit well into the current legislative and public transport procurement processes' (p202). It asks the Board to approve that off-line PT 'is parked and reviewed in 2028' (p205). TN3b records that a mass rapid transit scenario was 'omitted for implementability reasons' (p129).
"Board to approve that off-line PT to SH6A (e.g. a gondola) is parked and reviewed in 2028." (p.205) | "Given that the on-road public transport options are expected to have sufficient capacity for 30 years, then it is suggested that consideration of an off-line system be put on hold and reviewed in 2028 based on updated forecasts at the time and other factors at that time such as travel behavioural change and technology." (p.202) | "Another challenge with the gondola is that it does not fit well into the current legislative and public transport procurement processes but could be delivered by the private sector for its tourism benefits." (p.202) | "We consider that the gondola option is the best option at this point, simply because it is completely independent of the road network on State Highway 6A, provides hyper-frequency (every 30 seconds and possibly even less than this) and is fairly resilient to disruption, and provides for increased capacity." (p.224) | "Note that there might be a range of circumstances in which consideration should be given to advancing the Gondola option." (p.224) | "An additional scenario, Gondola MRT, was tested under the previous round of demand sets but was omitted for implementability reasons before this update." (p.129)
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Actions recorded
Approve that off-line public transport to SH6A (e.g. mass rapid transit) is parked and reviewed in 2028.
Not assessed · 2028 · Relevant to rapid transit
Board to approve that off-line PT to SH6A (e.g. a gondola) is parked and reviewed in 2028.
Note TN30 as an input to a proposed Detailed Business Case on public transport services and infrastructure, to move HCPT towards implementation.
Not assessed · Relevant to rapid transit
Board to note context of this paper is an input to a proposed Detailed Business Case on public transport services
Advise how to progress PT operational aspects, including a PT service operation DBC and whether it should sit under Way to Go, given W2G's mandate does not cover construction or operations.
Not assessed
Board to advise how to progress PT operational aspects to the next level of detail
Give consideration to advancing the mass rapid transit option if bus priority cannot be achieved, Bus Max funding is not forthcoming, demand grows faster than modelled, or a public-private partnership funds its transport benefits.
Not assessed · Not stated (before 2038) · Relevant to rapid transit
there might be a range of circumstances in which consideration should be given to advancing the Gondola option
If mass rapid transit is delivered by the private sector for tourism benefits, consider whether public investment in its public transport benefit has merit.
Not assessed · Relevant to rapid transit
it would be worth considering whether there was merit in public investment in any public transport benefit
Begin work very soon to secure funding, a bus depot site and fleet for the 2027 step change in Bus Max services under a new PT contract.
Not assessed · 2027-2030
requires work to get underway very soon
Include in DBC investigation extending the Jacks Point bus service to Queenstown Town Centre from about 2024.
Not assessed · 2024-2027
One response, worthy of inclusion in a DBC investigation, would be extending Jacks Point service to Queenstown TC
Decide between double-decker and articulated bus operation before subsequent DBC work, as it drives Frankton Hub design.
Not assessed · In advance of any subsequent DBC
This is a key project decision that needs to be made in advance of any subsequent DBC work
Show all 13 actions
Investigate an on-demand public transport service model for Queenstown Hill.
Not assessed
We recommend investigation of an on-demand service model for this area.
Consider a northbound bus lane on Lucas Place (Riverside Road roundabout to Airport roundabout).
Not assessed · Beyond 2028
It is recommended that a northbound bus lane on Lucas Place... is considered for implementation beyond 2028.
Consider northbound bus priority lanes south of Kawarau Falls Bridge, including to serve a park and ride near Boyd Road.
Not assessed · Beyond 2028
It is recommended that northbound bus priority lanes (and complimentary measures) are considered for implementation south of the Kawarau Falls Bridge beyond 2028.
Design southern housing growth areas with public transport as a priority, to future-proof the transport system.
Not assessed
the need to ensure housing areas to the south are designed with public transport as a priority
Keep the core bus network on Stanley Street, Shotover Street and Lake Esplanade rather than routing buses into Lakeview.
Not assessed
the core network... should continue to follow this route
Study cost
A study cost has been requested under the Official Information Act or LGOIMA. No figure has been received.
Citation
NZTA (Waka Kotahi). Appendix B Options Assessment (B1 Options Development Process; B2 Longlist Options; B3 Modelling Reports; B4 Future Public Transport Model; B5 Technical Note 30: High Capacity Public Transport; B6 Technical Note 12: Queenstown Public Transport Development Story; B7 Technical Note 18: Queenstown Lakeview Bus Service Analysis) (2020). NZTA Contract 2018235; Stantec Project No. 80510559 (TN30 footer, p193); FMOR Stantec Project No. 80510478 (p13); Abley Job NZTA-J116 (p76).